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Abstract
We present a dialogue on Counterparty Credit Risk touching on
Credit Value at Risk (Credit VaR), Potential Future Exposure (PFE),
Expected Exposure (EE), Expected Positive Exposure (EPE), Credit
Valuation Adjustment (CVA), Debit Valuation Adjustment (DVA),
DVA Hedging, Closeout conventions, Netting clauses, Collateral mod-
eling, Gap Risk, Re-hypothecation, Wrong Way Risk, Basel III, inclu-
sion of Funding costs, First to Default risk, Contingent Credit Default
Swaps (CCDS) and CVA restructuring possibilities through margin
lending. The dialogue is in the form of a Q&A between a CVA expert
and a newly hired colleague.
JEL classification code: G13, G33, H63
AMS classification codes: 60G51, 60G70, 60H35, 62G32, 65C05,
65C20, 91B70
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An updated version of this dialogue will appear as the
first chapter of the Wiley Finance (Nov 2012) Book
Counterparty Credit Risk, Collateral
and Funding with Pricing Cases for all Asset Classes
by Damiano Brigo1, Massimo Morini and Andrea Pallavicini
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1 A Dialogue on CVA
Although research on counterparty risk pricing started way back in the
nineties, with us joining the effort back in 2002, the different aspects of
counterparty credit risk exploded after the beginning of the financial crisis
in 2007. In less than four years we have seen the emergence of a num-
ber of features that the market operators are struggling to account for with
consistency. Further, the several possible definitions and methodologies for
counterparty risk may create further confusion. This dialogue is meant to
provide a colloquial guide to the different aspects of counterparty risk. It is
in the form of a Q&A between a CVA expert and a newly hired colleague,
and provides detailed references for investigating the different areas sketched
here more in detail.
2 Risk Measurement: Credit VaR
Q: [Junior colleague, he is looking a little worried] I am new in this area of
counterparty risk, and I am struggling to understand the different mea-
sures and metrics. Could you start by explaining what is counterparty
risk in general?
A: [Senior colleague, she is looking at the junior colleague reassuringly]
The risk taken on by an entity entering an Over The Counter (OTC)
contract with one (or more) counterparty having a relevant default
probability. As such, the counterparty might not respect its payment
obligations.
Q: What kind of counterparty risk practices are present in the market?
A: Several, but most can be divided into two broad areas. Counterparty
risk measurement for capital requirements, following Basel II, or coun-
terparty risk from a pricing point of view, when updating the price of
instruments to account for possible default of the counterparty. How-
ever, the distinction is now fading with the advent of Basel III.
Q: [Shifts nervously] Let us disentangle this a little, I am getting confused.
A: Fine. Where do we start from?
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Q: Let us start from Counterparty Risk Measurement for Capital Require-
ments. What is that?
A: It is a risk that one bank faces in order to be able to lend money or
invest towards a counterparty with relevant default risk. The bank
needs to cover for that risk by setting Capital aside, and this can be
done after the risk has been measured.
Q: You are saying that we aim at measuring that risk?
A: Indeed, and this measurement will help the bank decide how much
capital the bank should set aside (capital requirement) in order to be
able to face losses coming from possible defaults of counterparties the
bank is dealing with.
Q: Could you make an example of such a measure?
A: A popular such measure is Value at Risk (VaR). It is basically a per-
centile on the loss distribution associated with the position held by the
bank, over a given time horizon. More precisely, it is a percentile (say
the 99.9 percentile) of the initial value of the position minus the final
value at the risk horizon, across scenarios.
Q: Which horizon is usually taken?
A: When applied to default risk the horizon is usually one year and this is
called “Credit VaR”. If this is taken at the 99.9-th percentile, then you
have the loss that is exceeded only in 1 case out of 1000. The Credit
VaR is actually either the difference of the percentile from the mean,
or the percentile itself. There is more than one possible definition.
Q: Is this a good definition of Credit risk?
A: [Frowning] Well what does “good” really mean? It is not a universally
good measure. It has often been criticized, especially in the context of
pure market risk without default, for lack of sub-additivity. In other
terms, it does not always acknowledge the benefits of diversification,
in that in some paradoxical situations the risk of a total portfolio can
be larger than the sum of the risks in the single positions. A better
measure from that point of view would be expected shortfall, known
also as tail VaR, conditional VaR, etc.
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Q: And what is that?
A: This is loosely defined as the expected value of the losses beyond the
VaR point. But this needs not concern us too much here.
Q: Fine. How is Credit VaR typically calculated?
A: Credit VaR is calculated through a simulation of the basic financial
variables underlying the portfolio under the historical probability mea-
sure, commonly referred as P , up to the risk horizon. The simulation
also includes the default of the counterparties. At the risk horizon,
the portfolio is priced in every simulated scenario of the basic financial
variables, including defaults, obtaining a number of scenarios for the
portfolio value at the risk horizon.
Q: So if the risk horizon is one year, we obtain a number of scenarios for
what will be the value of the portfolio in one year, based on the eve-
olution of the underlying market variables and on the possible default
of the counterparties.
A: Precisely. A distribution of the losses of the portfolio is built based on
these scenarios of portfolio values. When we say ”priced” we mean to
say that the discounted future cash flows of the portfolio after the risk
horizon are averaged conditional on each scenario at the risk horizon
but under another probability measure, the Pricing measure, or Risk
Neutral measure, or Equivalent Martingale Measure if you want to go
technical, commonly referred as Q.
Q: Not so clear... [Looks confused]
A: [Sighing] All right, suppose your portfolio has a call option on equity,
traded with a Corporate client, with a final maturity of two years.
Suppose for simplicity there is no interest rate risk, so discounting is
deterministic. To get the Credit-Var, roughly, you simulate the under-
lying equity under the P measure up to one year, and obtain a number
of scenarios for the underlying equity in one year. Also, you need to
simulate the default scenarios up to one year, to know in each scenario
whether the counterparties have defaulted or not. This default simu-
lation up to one year is under the measure P as well. And you may
want to include the “correlation” between default of the counterparty
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and underlying equity, that would allow you to model wrong way risk
(WWR). But let us leave WWR aside for a moment.
Q: Ok. We simulate under P because we want the risk statistics of the
portfolio in the real world, under the physical probability measure, and
not under the so called pricing measure Q.
A: That’s right. And then in each scenario at one year, if the counterparty
has defaulted there will be a recovery value and all else will be lost.
Otherwise, we price the call option over the remaining year using for
example a Black Scholes formula. But this price is like taking the
expected value of the call option payoff in two years, conditional on
each scenario for the underlying equity in one year. Because this is
pricing, this expected value will be taken under the pricing measure Q,
not P . This gives the Black Scholes formula if the underlying equity
follows a geometric brownian motion under Q.
Q: So default needs to be simulated only under P? Where do you find
such probabilities?
A: [Frowning] This is a very difficult question. Often one uses probabil-
ities obtained through aggregation, like the probability associated to
the rating of the counterparty for example. But this is not very pre-
cise. Default of a single firm occurs only once, so determining the P
probability through direct historical observation is not possible...
Q: .....[shifts nervously on the chair]....
A: [Concentrating] Notice also that, in a more refined valuation, you may
want to take into account the default probability of the counterparty
also between 1 and 2 years in valuing the call option. But this would
be now the default probability under Q, not under P , because this is
pricing. But let us leave this aside for the time being, because this
leads directly to Credit Valuation Adjustments (CVA) which we will
address later. It would be like saying that in one year you compute the
option price value by taking into account its CVA.
Q: [Frowning] I think I need to understand better this P and Q thing. For
example, how are the default probabilities under P and Q different?
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A: The ones under Q, typically inferred from market prices of CDS or
corporate bonds, are typically larger than those under the measure P .
This has been observed a number of times. A comparison of the P
and Q loss distributions involved in Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs) is carried out for example in [82].
Q: Some more acronyms... In the meantime, where can I read more about
VaR and Expected Shortfall?
A: On a basic technical level you have books like [62], whereas to go at a
higher technical level you have books like [65]. For the original Credit
VaR framework it can be a good idea to have a look at the original
“Credit Metrics Technical Document” [7], which is available for exam-
ple at defaultrisk.com
3 Exposure, CE, PFE, EPE, EE, EAD
Q: Ok, I have more or less understood Credit VaR and ES. But I also
keep hearing the word “Exposure” in a lot of meetings. What is that,
precisely?
A: Let me borrow by [41]. [Calls up a paper on the screen of her tablet].
These are not exactly the definitions and calculations used in Basel, we
would need to go much more in detail for that, but are enough to give
you a good idea of what’s going on.
Q: Hopefully... [looks at her senior colleague skeptically]
A: [Rolls her eyes] Counterparty exposure at any given future time is the
larger between zero and the market value of the portfolio of derivative
positions with a counterparty that would be lost if the counterparty
were to default with zero recovery at that time.
Q: This is clear.
A: Current exposure (CE) is, obviously enough, the current value of the
exposure to a counterparty. This is simply the current value of the
portfolio if positive, and zero otherwise. This is typically the expected
value under the pricing measure Q of future cashflows, discounted back
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at the present time and added up, as seen from the present time, if
positive, and zero otherwise.
Q: Ok, I see.
A: Potential future exposure (PFE) for a given date is the maximum of
exposure at that date with a high degree of statistical confidence. For
example, the 95% PFE is the level of potential exposure that is exceeded
with only 5% P -probability. The curve of PFE in time is the potential
exposure profile, up to the final maturity of the portfolio of trades with
the counterparty.
Q: Why 95? And what about P and Q.
A: Just because [Amused]. On P and Q, let’s talk about that later.
Q: ....
A: PFE is usually computed via simulation: for each future date, the
price of the portfolio of trades with a counterparty is simulated. A
P -percentile of the distribution of exposures is chosen to represent the
PFE at the future date. The peak of PFE over the life of the portfolio
is called maximum potential future exposure (MPFE). PFE and MPFE
are usually compared with credit limits in the process of permissioning
trades.
Q: But wait... isn’t this what you said about Credit VaR? Because earlier
you said..
A: [Raising her hand] No, be careful... here there is no default simulation
involved, only the portfolio is simulated but not the default of the coun-
terparty. With exposure we answer the question: IF default happens,
what is going to be the loss?
Q: So in a way we assume that default happens for sure and we check
what would be the loss in that case. I see. No default simulation or
probabilities here.
A: Good. As we have seen above, with Credit VaR instead we answer
the question: what is the final loss that is not exceeded with a given
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P probability, over a given time horizon? This second question obvi-
ously involves the inclusion of the default event of the counterparty in
generating the loss.
Q: Ok I understand. And that’s it about Exposure, isnt’t it? [Smiling
hopefully]
A: By no means! [Amused]
Q: @#$!!@#&&@@!!!!
How many more bloody acronyms do I have to learn???
A: You should not use that language in a professional environment!
Q: You are right, such expressions are unheard of in professional environ-
ments, I am behaving very poorly.
A: Do I detect a note of sarcasm? No matter. Here you go. Expected
exposure (EE) is the average exposure under the P -measure on a future
date. The curve of EE in time, as the future date varies, provides the
expected exposure profile. Expected positive exposure (EPE) is the
average EE in time up to a given future date (for example, for dates
during a given year).
Q: Gosh...
A: And did I mention Exposure at Default (EAD)? This is simply de-
fined as the exposure valued at the (random future) default time of the
counterparty.
Q: That’s quite enough! [pulling his hair]
4 Exposure and Credit VaR
A: [Looking at the junior colleague in a motherly fashion] Ok let’s stop
here. Basel II provided some rules and approximations explaining how
such exposures could be approximated and calculated. Notice that the
default probabilities are not part of this picture. There is no default
simulation here, contrary to Credit VaR.
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Q: That’s right, you never mentioned default modeling here.
A: Essentially exposure measures how much you are likely to lose if the
counterparty defaults. With Credit VaR we also add the default prob-
ability to the picture and get a final value for the possible loss inclusive
of default probability information.
Q: And why is exposure important?
A: Banks use to measure counterparty risk internally using mainly 2 mea-
sures: PFE, which is mainly used internally to monitor when the credit
limits with the counterparties are breached, and EE, which is used,
when combined with other quantities, for the calculation of EAD and
the capital requirements due to counterparty risk. This last calcula-
tion may combine Exposures with default probabilities and recovery
estimates, and it produces an approximation to Credit VaR, which is
used as a capital requirement.
Q: So we go back again to a percentile of the loss under a given risk horizon.
What is the percentile and what is the risk horizon?
A: The risk horizon for this approximation of Credit VaR is typically one
year and the confidence level is 99.9%
Q: That would seem to be quite safe
A: That seems safe, but the approximations and the assumptions intro-
duced by Basel II to compute the approximated Credit VaR are not
realistic and have been heavily critized. See the OECD paper [12] for
an overview of the problems, some of them also affecting Basel III.
5 Interlude: P and Q
Q: More on P and Q? You keep mentioning these two probabilities mea-
sures as if they were obvious, but I don’t think they are... [looking
worringly at his senior colleague]
A: [Frowning again] Statistical properties of random objects such as future
losses depend on the probability measure we are using. Under two
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different probabilities a random variable will have usually two different
expected values, variances, medians, modes, etc.
Q: [Frowning in turn] So you are saying that a future random loss can
have a different distribution under two different measures, such as P
and Q? But what is P and what is Q, and why do they differ?
A: P , the historical or physical probability measure, also called real world
probability measure, is the probability measure under which we do his-
torical estimation of financial variables, econometrics, historical volatil-
ity estimation, maximum likelihood estimation, etc. When we need to
simulate the financial variables up to the risk horizon we are using
statistical techniques under P . When we try to make a prediction of
future market variables, again, we do it under P .
Q: I guess this is because prediction and risk measurement need to be done
with the statistics of the observed world. But why introducing another
probability measure Q? Why is it needed? [looking puzzled]
A: If instead of simulating financial variables for prediction or risk mea-
surement we are trying to price an option or a financial product, when
we price products in a no-arbitrage framework, the no-arbitrage theory
tells us that we need to take expected values of discounted future cash
flows under a different probability measure, namely Q.
Q: And how is this Q related to P? [still puzzled]
A: The two measures are related by a mathematical relationship that de-
pends on risk aversion, or market price of risk. In the simplest models
the real expected rate of return is given by the risk free rate plus the
market price of risk times the volatility. Indeed the ”expected” return
of an asset depends on the probability measure that is used. For exam-
ple, under P the average rate of return of an asset is hard to estimate,
whereas under Q one knows that the rate of return will be the risk free
rate, since dependence on the real rate of return can be hedged away
through replication techniques. [starts looking tired]
Q: And why should this be interesting? [ironic]
A: Well, maybe it’s not string theory or non-commutative topology (what
did you say you studied for your PhD?), but the fact that arbitrage free
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theory removes uncertainty about the expected rate of return by sub-
stituting it with the risk free rate has been a big incentive in developing
derivatives.
Q: Why is working under P so difficult? [puzzled]
A: Determining the real world or P expected return of an asset is difficult,
and rightly so, or else we would all be rich by knowing good estimates
of expected returns of all stocks in the future. [looks at the window
dreamingly]
A: This is a lot to take in...
Q: Let us say that you use P until the risk horizon and then Q to price
the portfolio at the risk horizon.
A: I think I am starting to get a grip on this. So let me ask: What is
“Basel”?
Q: A city in Switzerland?
A: Ah ah ah very funny...
6 Basel
A: Ok seriously... [pulls her tablet and visualizes a PDF document, hand-
ing the tablet to her junior colleague] ”Basel II” is a set of recom-
mendations on banking regulations issued by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. The “II” is due to the fact that this is a second
set of rules, first issued in 2004 and updated later on, following a first
set (Basel I) issued in 1998. Basel II has been introduced to create a
standard that regulators can use to establish how much capital a bank
needs to set aside to cover for financial and operational risks connected
to its lending and investing activities. Often banks tend to be willing
to employ as much capital as possible, and so the more the reserves
can be reduced while still covering the risks, the better for the banks.
In other terms, often banks aim at reducing the capital requirements
(i.e. the amounts to be set aside) to the minimum. Among Basel II
purposes, the two most interesting for us are
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– Have capital requirements reflect more the risks and being more
risk sensitive;
– Split operational risk and credit risk, quantifying both;
The capital requirements concern overall the three areas of credit - or
counterparty - risk, market risk, and operational risks. Here we deal
with the first two mostly, and in particular with the first. From this
capital adequacy point of view, the counterparty risk component can
be measured in three different frameworks of increasing complexity, the
”standardized approach”, the foundation Internal Rating-Based Ap-
proach (IRBA) and the advanced IRBA. The standardized approach
employs conservative measures of capital requirements based on very
simple calculations and quantities, so that if a bank follows that ap-
proach it is likely to find higher capital requirements than with the
IRBA’s. This is an incentive for banks to develop internal models for
counterparty risk and credit rating, although the credit crisis started
in 2007 is generating a lot of doubt and debate on the effectiveness of
Basel II and of banking regulation more generally. Basel regulation is
currently under revision in view of a new set of rules commonly referred
to as Basel III. We will get to Basel III later.
Q: Is the Basel accord considered to be effective? Has there been any
criticism?
A: You really are a rookie, aren’t you? Of course there has been a lot of
criticism. Have a look again at the OECD paper [12], for example.
Q: I’ll do that. So, we mentioned above two broad areas: (i) Counterparty
risk measurement for capital requirements, following Basel II, and the
related Credit VaR risk measure, or (ii) counterparty risk from a pricing
point of view. Basel II then concerns the capital one bank has to set
aside in order to lend money or invest towards a counterparty with
relevant default risk, to cover for that risk, and is related to Credit
VaR. What about the other area, i.e. pricing?
A: Pricing concerns updating the value of a specific instrument or port-
folio, traded with a counterparty, by altering the price to be charged
to the counterparty. This modification in price is done to account for
the default risk of the counterparty. Clearly, all things being equal, we
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would always prefer entering a trade with a default-free counterparty
than with a default risky one. Therefore we charge the default risky one
a supplementary amount besides the default-free cost of the contract.
This is often called Credit Valuation Adjustment, or CVA. Since it is
a price, it is computed entirely under the Q probability measure, the
pricing measure. In principle, the P probability measure does not play
a role here. We are computing a price, not measuring risk statistics.
Q: Has this concept been there for a long time or is it recent?
A: It has been there for a while, see for example [52], [9], [24]. However it
became more and more important after the 2008 defaults.
7 CVA and Model Dependence
Q: But this CVA term, how does it look like?
A: It looks like an option on the residual value of the portfolio, with a
random maturity given by the default time of the counterparty.
Q: Why an option? How does it originate?
A: If the counterparty defaults and the present value of the portfolio at
default is positive to the surviving party, then the surviving party only
gets a recovery fraction of the portfolio value from the defaulted en-
tity. If however the present value is negative to the surviving party,
the surviving party has to pay it in full to the liquidators of the de-
faulted entity. This creates and asymmetry that, once one has done all
calculations, says that the value of the deal under counterparty risk is
the value without counterparty risk minus a positive adjustment, called
CVA. This adjustment is the price of an option in the above sense. See
again [24] for details and a discussion.
Q: A price of an option with random maturity? Looks like a complicated
object... [frowning]
A: [Smiling] It is, and it is good that you realize it. Indeed it is quite
complicated. First of all, this is complicated because it introduces
model dependence even in products that were model independent to
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start with. Take for example a portfolio of plain vanilla swaps. You
don’t need a dynamic term structure model to price those, but only
the curves at the initial time.
Q: And what happens with CVA?
A: Now you have to price an option on the residual value of the portfolio
at default of the counterparty. To price an option on a swap portfolio
you need an interest rate option model. Therefore even if you portfolio
valuation was model independent before including counterparty risk,
now it is model dependent. This means that quick fixes to pricing
libraries are quite difficult to obtain.
Q: I see... Model dependence... and model risk. So anyway volatilities
and correlations would impact this calculation?
A: Yes, and dynamics features more generally. Volatilities of the under-
lying portfolio variables and also of the counterparty credit spreads
all impact valuation importantly. But also the statistical dependence
(or ”correlation”) between default of the counterparty and underlying
financial variables, leading to so called wrong way risk, can be very
important.
Q: Wrong Way Risk? WWR?
A: Yes, I am sure you heard this before.
Q: Well I am not sure about WWR, but before we go there hold on a
minute, I have another question.
A: [Sighing] Go ahead.
8 Input and Data issues on CVA
Q: You mentioned volatilities a correlations, but are they easy to measure?
A: That is both a very good and important question. No, they are not easy
to measure. We are pricing under the measure Q, so we would need
volatilities and correlation extracted from traded prices of products
that depend on such parameters.
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Q: But where can I extract the correlation between a specific corporate
counterparty default and the underlying of the trade, for example oil,
or a specific FX rate? And where do I extract credit spread volatilities
from?
A: [Looks at the young colleage with increased attention] You are not a
rookie then if you ask such questions, you must have some experience.
Q: [Sighing] Not really... I heard such questions at a meeting of the new
products committee yesterday, as I was sitting in a corner as the resi-
dent newbie, and started thinking about these issues.
A: [Sighing in turn] Well at least you learn fast. Let me tell you that the
situation is actually worse. For some counterparties it is even difficult
to find levels for their default probabilities, not to mention expected
recoveries.
Q: Aren’t Q default probabilities deduced from Credit Default Swap or
corporate bond counterparty data?
A: Yes they are... in principle. But many counterparties do not have a liq-
uid CDS or even bond traded. What if your counterparty is the airport
of Duckburg? Where are you going to imply default probabilities from,
leave alone credit volatilities and credit-underlying ”correlations”? And
recoveries?
Q: Recoveries, indeed, aren’t those just 0.4? [Grinning]
A: [Rolling eyes] Right. Just like that. However let me mention that when
the Q statistics are not available, one first attempt one can consider
is using P -statistics instead. One can estimate credit spread volatility
historically if no CDS or corporate bond option implied volatility is
available. Also historical correlations between the counterparty credit
spreads and the underlying portfolio of the trade can be much easier to
access than implied ones. It is clearly an approximation but it is better
than no idea at all. Even default probabilities, when not available
under Q, may be considered under P and then perhaps ajusted for
an aggregate estimate of credit risk premia. Rating information can
provide rough aggregate default probabilities for entities such as the
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airport of Duckburg if one has either an internal or external rating for
small medium enterprises (SME).
Q: Aren’t there a lot of problems with rating agencies?
A: Yes there are, and I am open to better ideas if you have anything to
propose.
Q: Not easy... But leaving aside default probabilities, credit correlations,
credit-underlying correlations, and recoveries...
A: You are leaving aside quite some material...
Q: ... what about the underlying contract Q dynamics, is that clear for
all asset classes?
A: For a number of asset classes, traditional derivatives markets provide
you with underlying market levels, volatilities and market-market ”cor-
relations”. But not always.
Q: Can you provide an example where this does not work?
9 Emerging asset classes: Longevity Risk
A: Let me think... yes that could be a good example, longevity risk.
Q: I was never sure how to pronounce that in English.
A: It is longevity, [lon-jev-i-tee], as I pronounced it, ”ge” like in ”George”
rather than ”get”.
Q: Longevity... but what kind of risk is that? I wouldn’t mind leaving a
long time, provided the quality of life is good.
A: It is not a risk for you, it is a risk for your pension provider. If you
leave longer than expected then the pension fund needs extra funding
to keep your pension going.
Q: Right [touching wood on the table].
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A: [Laughing] If you find the name disturbing, we may call it mortality
risk. Anyway with longevity swaps the problem is also finding the
underlying Q-dynamics, both in levels and volatilities, namely levels
and volatilities of mortality rates...
Q: Wait a minute. Longevity swaps? What is a longevity swap? Sounds
like a pact with the devil for longer life in exchange of your soul or...
A: [Raising her hand] Can’t you be professional for a minute? A longevity
swap is a contract where one party (typically a pension fund) pays a
pre-assigned interest rate in exchange for a floating rate linked to the
realized mortality rate in a given country, or area, over a past window
of time.
Q: Sorry for the interruptions, ok this makes sense. So I guess the problem
is the calibration of the mortality rate dynamics in pricing the future
cash flows of the swap?
A: Indeed, the problem is that for this product there is basically almost
no information from which one can deduce the Q dynamics... I wonder
actually if it even makes sense to talk about Q-dynamics. If swaps were
very liquid we could imply a term structure of mortality rates from the
prices, and also possibly implied volatilities if options on this swaps
became liquid.
Q: And I imagine that, being linked to pensions, these contracts have large
maturities, so that counterparty risk is relevant?
A: Precisely. Now this is an emerging area for counterparty risk, with al-
most no literature, except the excellent initial paper [10]. In terms of
Q-dynamics, a first approach could be to use the P -dynamics and as-
sume there is no market price of risk, at least until the market develops
a little further.
Q: Here I think it may be really hard to find data for the statistical de-
pendence between the underlying mortality rates and the default of the
counterparty, which brings us back to the subject of Wrong Way Risk,
on which I have many general questions.
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10 CVA and Wrong Way Risk
A: [Shifting on the chair] Oh I’m sure you do! Let me try and anticipate a
few of them. WWR is the additional risk you have when the underlying
portfolio and the default of the counterparty are “correlated” in the
worst possible way for you.
Q: For example?
A: Suppose you are trading an oil swap with an airline and you are receiv-
ing floating (variable) oil and paying fixed. We may envisage a positive
correlation between the default of the airline and the price of oil, since
higher prices of oil will put the airline under more stress to finance
her operations. When the correlation is extremely high, so that at a
marked increase of oil there is a corresponding marked increased in the
airline default probability, we have the worst possible loss at default of
the airline. Indeed, with high oil price increase the oil swap now has a
much larger value for us, and there is a higher probability of default of
the airline due to the correlation. If the airline defaults now it will do
so in a state where the mark to market is quite high in our favor, so
that we face a large loss. This is an example of wrong way risk.
Q: Has Wrong Way Risk been studied?
A: Yes, see for example the following references for such issues in different
asset classes: [24], [30], [36], [37] for equity, [31], [32] for interest rates,
[16] for commodities (Oil), [21] for Credit (CDS).
Q: So there has been literature available on wrong way risk. Going back to
the option structure of CVA, since options are priced under Q, I would
guess that CVA calculations occur mostly under Q. But can one really
work only under Q?
A: Before the crisis started in 2007, in front office environment it has
been relatively common to work under Q, forgetting about P . One
would postulate models for market processes and then calibrate them
to prices, that are expectations under Q. Then simulations to compute
prices of other products as expected values would still be done under
Q. Similarly, to compute hedge ratios Q used to be enough. P used to
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be ignored except for risk measurement and possibly stress testing and
model validation.
Q: And is this a good thing? [perlexed]
A: [Frowning] It is good because it allows you to avoid modeling the same
processes under two probability measures, which could be rather tricky,
since the real world P statistics are often hard to obtain, as we ex-
plained above. But on the other hand one should really do a combined
estimation of a pricing model based on the observed history of prices.
The prices are Q expectations but they move in time following the
evolution of basic market variables under the P measure. Kalman and
more generally non-linear filtering techniques can be used to obtain a
joint estimation of the underlying market processes, which would in-
corporate market history (P ) AND risk neutral expectations (Q) at the
same time. This implicitly estimates also market aversion, connecting
P and Q.
Q: So all the attention to Counterparty risk now is about P (Credit VaR)
or Q (CVA)?
A: [Looking at the ceiling] At the moment most attention is on CVA, but
now with Basel III the distinction is blurring.
11 Basel III: VaR of CVA and Wrong Way
Risk
Q: What do you mean? Give me a break! It is already complicated enough!
A: Relax. Let us say that Credit VaR measures the risk of losses you
face due to the possible default of some counterparties you are having
business with. CVA measures the pricing component of this risk, i.e.
the adjustment to the price of a product due to this risk.
Q: This is clear.
A: But now suppose that you revalue and mark to market CVA in time.
Suppose that CVA moves in time and moves against you, so that you
have to book negative losses NOT because the counterparty actually
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defaults, but because the Pricing of this risk has changed for the worse
for you. So in this sense you are being affected by CVA volatility.
Q: Ah...
A: To quote Basel III: [Visualizes a document on her tablet]
“Under Basel II, the risk of counterparty default and credit migra-
tion risk were addressed but mark-to-market losses due to credit valua-
tion adjustments (CVA) were not. During the financial crisis, however,
roughly two-thirds of losses attributed to counterparty credit risk were
due to CVA losses and only about one-third were due to actual de-
faults.”
Q: So in a way the variability of the price of this risk over time has made
more damage than the risk itself?
A: I guess you could put it that way, yes. This is why Basel is considering
setting up quite severe capital charges against CVA.
Q: And why did you say that this blurs the picture?
A: Because, now, you may decide that you need a VaR estimate for your
CVA, especially after the above Basel III statement.
Q: How would this be computed?
A: You could simulate basic market variables under P , up to the risk
horizon. Then, in each scenario, you price the residual CVA until
the final maturity using a Q expectation. You put all the prices at
the horizon time together in a histogram and obtain a profit and loss
distribution for CVA at the risk horizon. On this P distribution you
select a quantile at the chosen confidence level and now you will have
computed VaR of CVA. But this does not measure the default risk
directly, it measures the risk to have a mark to market loss due either
to default or to adverse CVA change in value over time.
Q: ... while Credit VaR only measures the default risk, i.e. the risk of
a loss due to a direct default of the counterparty. Let’s go back to
counterparty risk as a whole now. Where is our focus in all of this?
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A: Here we are dealing mostly with CVA valuation. So we give more
relevance to Q than P , but we’ll have a number of comments on P as
well.
Q: So what is Basel III saying about CVA, specifically?
A: Well the framework has changed several times: Bond Equivalent for-
mula, multipliers... One of the main issues has to do with Wrong Way
Risk (WWR).
Q: What do you mean?
A: In some part of the Basel regulation it had been argued that you could
calculate CVA as if there were no wrong way risk, and then use a
standard multiplier to account for wrong way risk.
Q: So I should assume independence between default of the counterparty
and underlying portfolio, compute CVA, and then multiply for a given
number to account for correlation risk?
A: Something like that. However, this does not work. Depending on the
specific dynamics of the underlying financial variables, on volatilities
and correlations, and on the chosen models, the multipliers vary a lot.
See again [30], [31], [16] and [21] for examples from several asset classes.
The multipliers are very volatile and fixing them is not a good idea.
Even if one were to use this idea only for setting capital requirements of
well diversified portfolios, this could lead to bitter surprises in situations
of systemic risk. And there is a further problem...
Q: What else???!!? [looking desperate]
12 Discrepancies in CVA valuation: Model
risk and Payoff Risk
A: Relax, relax... Look we can take a break, you look too distressed.
Q: Ok let’s have a coffee.
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A: I would advise a camomille...
[Twenty minutes later]
A: Let’s go on. Basel III recognizes CVA risk but does not recognize
DVA risk, the quantity one needs to introduce to make counterparty
risk work from an accounting perspective. This creates a misalignment
between CVA calculations for capital adequacy purposes and CVA cal-
culations for accounting and mark to market. This is part of a more
general problem.
Q: Really? Sounds unbelievable that two bits of regulation can be at odds
like that!
A: I can show you. Look at this:
This CVA loss is calculated without taking into account any offsetting
debit valuation adjustments which have been deducted from capital
under paragraph 75. (Basel III, page 37, July 2011 release)
Because nonperformance risk (the risk that the obligation will not be
fulfilled) includes the reporting entitys credit risk, the reporting entity
should consider the effect of its credit risk (credit standing) on the fair
value of the liability in all periods in which the liability is measured at
fair value under other accounting pronouncements” (FAS 157)
Q: Surprisingly clear and at odds.
A: Well since you seem to enjoy it, here is what the former president of
the Basel Committee said:
”The potential for perverse incentives resulting from profit being linked
to decreasing creditworthiness means capital requirements cannot recog-
nise it, says Stefan Walter, secretary-general of the Basel Committee:
The main reason for not recognising DVA as an offset is that it would be
inconsistent with the overarching supervisory prudence principle under
which we do not give credit for increases in regulatory capital arising
from a deterioration in the firms own credit quality.” (Stefan Walter)
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Q: I am quite confused. Should I compute DVA or not?
A: It depends on the purpose you are computing it for. However, the
situation is not that clear, there are a number of issues more generally
with counterparty risk pricing.
Q: You mean objectivity on CVA valuation?
A: I mean that there is a lot of model risk and of “payoff risk” if we want
to call it that.
Q: I understand model risk, since this is highly model dependent, but what
do you mean by payoff risk?
A: There are a lot of choices to be done when computing CVA, both on the
models to be used, and on the type of CVA to be computed. We will see
below that there are choices to be made on whether it is unilateral or
bilateral, on the closeout formulation, on how you account for collateral
and re-hypothecation, on whether you include first to default, and on
how you account for funding costs, and so on. Due to the variety of
possible different definitions of CVA and of modeling choices, there
appears to be material discrepancies in CVA valuation across financial
institutions, as pointed out in the recent article [83].
13 Bilateral Counterparty Risk: CVA and
DVA
Q: Wait you’re going too fast. You mentioned DVA above and I don’t
even know what it is. What is DVA?
A: Debit Valuation Adjustment. It has to do with both parties in a deal
agreeing on the counterparty risk charge.
Q: Let me get this straight. Let’s say that we are doing pricing, at a
point in time, of the risk that the counterparty defaults before the final
maturity of the deal, on a specific portfolio. This is the CVA. It is
a positive quantity, an adjustment to be subtracted from the default-
risk free price in order to account for the counterparty default risk in
the valuation. Clearly, having the choice and all things being equal,
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one would prefer to trade a deal with a default risk free counterparty
rather than with a risky one. So I understand the risk free price needs
to be decreased through a negative adjustment, i.e. the subtraction of a
positive term called CVA. Now you are implicitly raising the question:
Since it is an adjustment and it is always negative, what happens from
the point of view of the other party?
A: Indeed, that’s what I am saying. In this setup there is no possibility
for both parties to agree, unless they both recognize that one of the
calculating parties is default free. Suppose we have two parties in the
deal, a bank and a corporate counterparty. If they both agree that the
bank can be treated as default-free, then the bank will mark a negative
adjustment on the risk free price of the deal with the corporate client,
and the corporate client will mark a corresponding positive adjustment
(the opposite of the negative one) to the risk free price. This way both
parties will agree on the price.
Q: The adjustment for the corporate client is positive because the client
needs to compensate the bank for the client default risk?
A: Indeed, this is the case. The adjustment seen from the point of view
of the corporate client is positive, and is called Debit Valuation Ad-
justment, DVA. It is positive because the early default of the client
itself would imply a discount on the client payment obligations, and
this means a gain in a way. So the client marks a positive adjustment
over the risk free price by adding the positive amount called DVA. In
this case, where the bank is default free, the DVA is also called Unilat-
eral DVA, UDVA, since only the default risk of the client is included.
Similarly, the adjustment marked by the bank by subtraction is called
Unilateral CVA, UCVA. In this case UCVA(bank) = UDVA(corporate),
ie the adjustment to the risk free price is the same, but it is added by
the corporate client and subtracted by the bank.
Q: But then the UCVA(corporate) must be zero, because the bank is de-
fault free.
Q: Correct, and similarly UDVA(bank) = UCVA(corporate) = 0.
Q: But what happens when the two firms do not agree on one of them being
default free? Say that in your example the corporate client does not
D. Brigo: Counterparty Credit Risk FAQ / Dialogue 28
accept the bank as default free (a reasonable objection after Lehman...)
A: Well in this case then the only possibility to agree on a price is for both
parties to consistently include both defaults into the valuation. Hence
every party needs to include its own default besides the default of the
counterparty into the valuation. Now both parties will mark a positive
CVA to be subtracted and a positive DVA to be added to the default
risk free price of the deal. The CVA of one party will be the DVA of
the other one and viceversa.
Q: So every party will compute the final price as [writes on a notebook]
DEFAULT RISK FREE PRICE + DVA - CVA ?
A: Indeed. In our example when the bank does the calculation,
Price To Bank = DEFAULT RISK FREE PRICE to Bank + DVA
Bank - CVA Bank
whereas when the corporate does the calculation one has a similar
formula. Now, since
DEFAULT RISK FREE PRICE to Bank = - DEFAULT RISK FREE
PRICE to Corporate
DVA Bank = CVA Corporate
DVA Corporate = CVA Bank
we get that eventually
Price To Bank = - Price To Corporate
so that both parties agree on the price, or, we could say, there is money
conservation.
We could call Bilateral Valuation Adjustment (BVA) to one party the
difference DVA - CVA as seen from that party,
BVA = DVA - CVA
Clearly BVA to Bank = - BVA to corporate.
Q: Clear enough... so what is meant usually by “bilateral CVA”?
A: Good question. By looking at the formula
BVA = DVA - CVA
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bilateral CVA could refer both to BVA, or just to the CVA component
of BVA on the right hand side. Usually the industry uses the term
to denote BVA, and we will do so similarly, except when explicitly
countered.
Q: Ok, summarizing... if we ask when valuation of counterparty risk is
symmetric, meaning that if the other party computes the counterparty
risk adjustment towards us she finds the opposite number, so that both
parties agree on the charge, the answer is... [hesitating]
A: The answer is that this happens when we include the possibility that
also the entity computing the counterparty risk adjustment (i.e. us in
the above example) may default, besides the counterparty itself.
Q: Is there any technical literature on Bilateral CVA and on DVA?
A: Yes, the first calculations are probably again in [52], who however resort
to specific modeling choices where credit risk is purely accounted for by
spreads and it is hard to create a strong dependence between underlying
and default, so that Wrong Way Risk is hard to model. Furthermore,
that paper deals mostly with swaps. Again, swaps with bilateral default
risk are dealt with in [9], but the paper where bilateral risk is examined
in detail and DVA derived is [18], where bilateral risk is introduced in
general and then analyzed for CDS. In the following works [33], [19], and
[20] several other features of bilateral risk are carefully examined, also
in relationship with wrong way risk, collateral and extreme contagion,
and gap risk, showing up when default happens between margining
dates and a relevant mark to market change for the worse has occurred.
In this respect, [19] shows a case of an underlying CDS with strong
default contagion where even frequent margining in collateralization is
quite uneffective. For a basic introduction to bilateral CVA see [57].
Q: There’s too much material to read already!
A: Well that’s why I’m trying to give you a summary here.
Q: Ok thanks, at least now I have an idea of what Bilateral CVA and DVA
are about.
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14 First to Default in CVA and DVA
A: Yes, but you have to be careful. BVA is not just the difference of DVA
and CVA computed each as if in a universe where only one name can
default. In computing DVA and CVA in the difference you need to
account for both defaults of Bank and Corporate in both terms. This
means that effectively there is a first to default check. If the bank is
doing the calculations, in scenarios where the bank defaults first the
DVA term will be activated and the CVA term vanishes, whereas in
scenarios where the corporate defaults first then the bank DVA vanishes
and the bank CVA payoff activates. So we need to check who defaults
first.
Q: Indeed, I heard “first to default risk” in connection with Bilateral CVA.
Now, in computing the CVA and DVA terms, we should know who
defaults first, that’s what you are saying. That makes sense: to close
the position in the right way and at the right time, I need to know who
defaults first and when.
A: Correct. However, some practitioners implemented a version of BVA
that ignores first to default times. Suppose you are the bank. Then for
you
BVABank = DVABank - CVABank
See for example [75]. What you do now is computing DVABank as in a
world where only you may default, and then compute CVABank as in
a world where only the corporate client may default. But you do not
kill the other term as soon as there is a first default. So in a sense you
are double counting, because you are not really closing the deal at the
first default if you do as we just said. The correct BVA includes a first
to default check.
Q: My head is spinning... let me try to summarize.
A: Go ahead
Q: You have to be careful with Bilateral CVA. BVA is not just the differ-
ence of DVA and CVA computed each as if in a universe where only one
name can default. In computing DVA and CVA in the difference you
need to account for both defaults of Bank and Corporate in both terms.
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This means that effectively there is a first to default check. If the bank
is doing the calculations, in scenarios where the bank defaults first the
DVA term will be activated and the CVA term vanishes, whereas in
scenarios where the corporate defaults first then the bank DVA van-
ishes and the bank CVA payoff activates. So we need to check who
defaults first.
A: Excellent, even better than my original explanation. More than a sum-
mary it looks like an essay!
Q: Well, not that I am going to write a paper on this.
A: Someone did already, see [17]. The error in neglecting the first to
default risk can be quite sizeable even in simple examples.
15 DVA mark to market and DVA hedging
Q: I don’t know, from all you told me I am not at ease with this idea of
DVA. It is a reduction on my debt due to the fact that I may default,
and if I default I won’t pay all my debt, so it is like a gain, but I only
can realize this gain as a cash flow if I default!!
A: I agree it can be disconcerting. And consider this: if your credit quality
worsens and you recompute your DVA, you mark a gain.
Q: Has this really happened?
A: Citigroup in its press release on the first quarter revenues of 2009 re-
ported a positive mark to market due to its worsened credit quality:
[pulls out her tablet] “Revenues also included [...] a net 2.5$ billion
positive CVA on derivative positions, excluding monolines, mainly due
to the widening of Citi’s CDS spreads”
Q: Ah...
A: More recently, From the Wall Street Journal
October 18, 2011, 3:59 PM ET. Goldman Sachs Hedges Its Way to
Less Volatile Earnings. Goldman’s DVA gains in the third quar-
ter totaled $450 million, about $300 million of which was recorded un-
der its fixed-income, currency and commodities trading segment and
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another $150 million recorded under equities trading. That amount
is comparatively smaller than the $1.9 billion in DVA gains that J.P.
Morgan Chase and Citigroup each recorded for the third quarter. Bank
of America reported $1.7 billion of DVA gains in its investment bank.
Analysts estimated that Morgan Stanley will record $1.5 billion of net
DVA gains when it reports earnings on Wednesday [...]
Q: Sounds strange, you gain from the deterioration of your credit quality...
and you lose from improvement of your credit quality. So how could
DVA be hedged? One should sell protection on oneself, an impossible
feat, unless one buys back bonds that he had issued earlier. This may
be hard to implement, though. [looking more and more puzzled]
A: It seems that most times DVA is hedged by proxying. Instead of selling
protection on oneself, one sells protection on a number of names that
one thinks are highly correlated to oneself. Again from the WSJ article
above: [toting her tablet at the junior colleague]
“[...] Goldman Sachs CFO David Viniar said Tuesday that the com-
pany attempts to hedge [DVA] using a basket of different financials. A
Goldman spokesman confirmed that the company did this by selling
CDS on a range of financial firms. [...] Goldman wouldnt say what
specific financials were in the basket, but Viniar confirmed [...] that
the basket contained a peer group. Most would consider peers to Gold-
man to be other large banks with big investment-banking divisions,
including Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Cit-
igroup and others. The performance of these companies bonds would
be highly correlated to Goldman’s.”
Q: It seems to be relatively common practice then. Mmmmmm... isn’t it
risky? Proxying can be misleading [shaking his head]
A: [Shrugging] Admittedly... This can approximately hedge the spread
risk of DVA, but not the jump to default risk. Merrill hedging DVA
risk by selling protection on Lehman would not have been a good idea.
In fact this attitude, in presence of jump to default risk, can worsen
systemic risk.
Q: Indeed, I can see that. If I sell protection on a firm that is correlated to
me to hedge my DVA, and then that firm not only has his credit quality
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worsen (which would hedge my DVA changes due to spread movements)
but actually defaults, then I have to make the protection payments and,
paradoxycally, that could push me into default! [Looking at the senior
colleague excitedly]
A: Sounds crazy, isn’t it? [Grinning]
16 Impact of Closeout in CVA and DVA
Q: Well, to be perfectly honest, it does, but maybe it’s just you and I being
not sophisticated enough. However, there seem to be other matters that
are as pressing. I am having a hard time figuring out what this other
problem with closeout is, for example.
A: [Sighs] Closeout is what happens basically when one name defaults. So
suppose in our example the corporate client defaults. Closeout pro-
ceedings are then started according to regulations and ISDA2 docu-
mentation. The closeout procedure establishes the residual value of
the contract to the bank, and how much of that is going to be paid to
the bank party, provided it it positive. If it is negative then the bank
will have to pay the whole amount to the corporate.
Q: Well this seems simply the definition of CVA payout.
A: Ah, but let me ask you a question. At the default time of the Corporate,
you are the Bank. Do you value the remaining contract by taking into
account your own credit quality (in other terms, your now unilateral
DVA, “replacement closeout”) or just by using the risk free price (“risk
free closeout”)? The replacement closeout argues that if you are going
now to re-open the deal with a risk free party, the risk free party will
charge you your unilateral CVA, which, seen from your point of view,
is your unilateral DVA. Hence in computing the replacement value you
should include your DVA to avoid discontinuity in valuation. If you
always used DVA to value the deal prior to the Corporate’s default,
you should not stop doing so at default if you aim at being consistent.
2International Swaps and Derivatives Association
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Q: But there seem to be two choices here, risk free or replacement close-
out. What is the difference? Is it just consistency and continuity of
valuation?
A: The counterparty risk adjustments change strongly depending on which
assumption is chosen in the computation of the closeout amount, and
the choice has important consequences on default contagion.
Q: I would naively think that risk free closeout is simpler and more “ob-
jective”.
A: Well in [29], [27] and [28] it is shown that a risk-free closeout has
implications that are very different from what we are used to expect
in case of a default in standardized markets such as the bond or loan
markets. Let us take a case of BVA where the valuation is always in the
same direction, such as a loan or a bond. Suppose the bank owns the
bond. If the owner of a bond defaults, or if the lender in a loan defaults,
this means no losses to the bond issuer (the Corporate in our example)
or to the loan borrower. Instead, if the risk-free default closeout applies,
when there is default of the party which is a net creditor in a derivative
(thus in a position similar to a bond owner or loan lender, the Bank),
the value of the liability of the net debtor will suddenly jump up. In
fact, before the default, the liability of the net debtor had a mark-to-
market that took into account the risk of default of the debtor itself.
After the default of the creditor, if a risk-free closeout applies, this
mark-to-market transforms into a risk-free one, surely larger in absolute
value than the pre-default mark-to-market.
Q: This appears to be definitely wrong. [Shaking his head again]
17 Closeout Contagion
A: You are taking it too personally. Calm down. It’s actually worse. The
increase will be larger the larger the credit spreads of the debtor. This
is a dramatic surprise for the debtor that will soon have to pay this
increased amount of money to the liquidators of the defaulted party.
There is a true contagion of a default event towards the debtors of a
defaulted entity, that does not exist in the bond or loan market. Net
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debtors at default will not like a risk-free closeout. They will prefer a
replacement closeout, which does not imply a necessary increase of the
liabilities since it continues taking into account the credit-worthiness
of the debtor also after the default of the creditor.
Q: You are saying that the replacement closeout inherits one property
typical of fundamental markets: if one of the two parties in the deal
has no future obligations, like a bond or option holder, his default
probability does not influence the value of the deal at inception.
A: Correct. One could, based on this, decide to use replacement closeout
all the time, since it is consistent with this basic principle. However,
the replacement closeout has shortcomings opposite to those of the risk-
free closeout. While the replacement closeout is preferred by debtors
of a defaulted company, symmetrically a risk-free closeout will be pre-
ferred by the creditors. The more money debtors pay, the higher the
recovery will be. The replacement closeout, while protecting debtors,
can in some situations worryingly penalize the creditors by abating the
recovery.
Q: What are such cases?
A: Consider the case when the defaulted entity is a company with high
systemic impact, so that when it defaults the credit spreads of its coun-
terparties are expected to jump high. Lehman’s default could be a good
example of such a situation. If the credit spreads of the counterparties
increase at default, under a replacement closeout the market value of
their liabilities will be strongly reduced, since it will take into account
the reduced credit-worthiness of the debtors themselves. All the claims
of the liquidators towards the debtors of the defaulted company will
be deflated, and the low level of the recovery may be again a dramatic
surprise, but this time for the creditors of the defaulted company.
Q: [Baffled] It seems unbelievable that no clear regulation was available
for this issue.
A: [Sighing] Well this is because there is no ideal solution. You may sum-
marize the choice according to this table, let me draw it for you [Draws
Table 1 on her tablet]. As you see, there is no optimal choice guarantee-
ing no contagion. Depending on the “correlation” structure between
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default of the borrower and the lender party in the transaction, the
optimal choice is different. ISDA cannot set a standard that is corre-
lation dependent, so it is understandable that there are difficulties in
standardizing closeout issues.
Dependence→ independence co-monotonicity
Closeout↓
Risk Free Negatively affects No contagion
Borrower
Replacement No contagion Further Negatively
affects Lender
Table 1: Impact of the default of the Lender (Bank) under risk free or replace-
ment closeout and under independence or co-monotonicity between default
of the Lender and of the Borrower (Corporate)
Q: It looks more and more complicated. So many choices...
A: It’s not over yet in terms of issues. But it’s not that bad, that will keep
us working for a long time [sarcastically].
Q: So what are the next issues that are keeping CVA people busy?
A: Collateral modeling, possible re-hypothecation, netting, Capital re-
quirements around CVA for Basel III and possibilities to reduce them
through restructuring, collateral or margin lending. Finally, consistent
inclusion of funding costs...
Q: [Rolling his eyes] That’s quite enough. Let’s start from Collateral.
18 Collateral Modeling in CVA and DVA
A: Collateral is an asset (say Cash for simplicity) that is posted frequently
as a guarantee for due payments following mark to market, by the party
to whom mark to market is negative. The guarantee is to be used by
the party to whom mark to market is positive in case the other party
defaults.
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Q: That seems the end of counterparty risk then.
A: Indeed, Collateral would be the main and most effective tool against
counterparty risk, with two caveats. It is not always effective, even
under frequent margining, and it can be expensive. It is shown in [19]
and [20] that even very frequent margining may not be enough to fully
protect from Counterparty Risk. The fact is that in extreme scenarios,
the portfolio value may have moved a lot from the last margining date,
even if this was a few moments ago. In [19] an example is given, with
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as underlying instruments, where the de-
fault of the counterparty triggers an immediate jump in the underlying
CDS by contagion, so that the collateral that was posted an instant
earlier is not enough to cover the loss.
Q: Is this a rather abstract case?
A: I wouldn’t think so, given what happened in 2008 after Lehman’s de-
fault, and also keeping in mind that we had seven credit events on
financials that happened in one month during the period going from
September, 7 2008 to October, 8 2008, namely the credit events on Fan-
nie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Lands-
banki, Glitnir and Kaupthing.
Q: And what is re-hypothecation then?
19 Re-hypothecation
A: Re-hypothecation means that the collateral that has been received as
a guarantee can be utilized as an investment or as further collateral.
Suppose we are again in the example above with a bank and a corporate
client. Suppose that at a margining date the mark to market of the
portfolio is in favor of the bank, i.e. positive to the bank, so that the
corporate client is posting collateral. If re-hypothecation is allowed, the
bank is free to re-invest the collateral. Now suppose that there is an
extreme movement in the market, such that the mark to market of the
portfolio turns in favor of the corporate, and before the next collateral
adjustment margining date arrives, the bank (and not the corporate)
defaults.
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Q: Uh-oh
A: Indeed, ”Uh-oh”, but as I said don’t take it personally. The bank
defaults while the mark to market of the portfolio is in favor of the
corporate. Also, the bank had reinvested the collateral that had been
posted by the corporate earlier. So the corporate client takes a double
punishment: a loss of mark to market, and a loss of collateral.
Q: This sounds like a problem
A: It is, and parts of the industry have made pressure to forbid re-hypothecation.
While this is reasonable, the impossibility to re-invest collateral makes
it particularly expensive, since the collateral taker needs to remunerate
the interest on collateral to the collateral provider, now without the
possibility to re-invest collateral.
Q: What is the extent of the impact of re-hypothecation on CVA?
A: This has been studied in a few papers, see for example again [19] and
[20].
Q: So many things to read... what about Netting then?
20 Netting
A: Netting is an agreement where, upon default of your counterparty, you
do not check the losses at single deal level but rather at the netted
portfolio level.
Q: Could you provide an example please?
A: Suppose you are the bank and you are trading two interest rate swaps
with the same corporate, whose recovery rate is 0.4. Suppose at a point
in time the two swaps have exactly the opposite value to the bank, say
+1 M USD and -1M USD respectively. Now assume that the corporate
client defaults. In the case with netting, the two swaps are netted, so
that we compute 1M - 1M =0 and there is no loss to account for. In
the case without netting, the two deals are treated separately. In the
first swap, the bank loses (1-REC)1M = 0.6 M. In the second swap,
the bank loses nothing.
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Q: I see...
A: Now in view of charging a fair CVA to the corporate, the bank needs
to know whether there is netting or not, since as you have seen the
difference can be rather important. In general unilateral CVA with
netting is always smaller than without netting.
Q: And why is that?
A: This is because CVA is like a call option with zero strike on the residual
value of the deal, and an option on a sum is smaller than the sum of
options.
Q: Has netting been studied?
A: There is a paper on netting for interest rate swaps where an approxi-
mate formula has also been derived, see [24], but there is no wrong way
risk. Netting with wrong way risk has been examined in [31].
21 Funding
Q: Ok, we covered quite a lot of stuff. There is a further topic I keep
hearing around. It’s the inclusion of Cost of Funding into the valuation
framework. Is this actually happening?
A: Yes, that’s all the rage now. If you attend a practitioner conference, a
lot of talks will be on consistent inclusion of funding costs. However,
very few works try to build a consistent picture where funding costs
are consistently included together with CVA, DVA, collateral, closeout
etc.
Q: Some examples?
A: The working paper [47], then published in [48] and [49], is the most
comprehensive treatment I have seen so far. The only limitation is
that it does not allow for underlying credit instruments in the portfolio,
and has possible issues with FX. It is a very technical paper. A related
framework that is more general and includes most recent literature as a
special case is in [34]. Earlier works are partial but still quite important.
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Q: For example?
A: The industry paper [76] considers the problem of replication of deriva-
tive transactions under collateralization but without default risk and in
a purely classical Black and Scholes framework, considering then two
relatively basic special cases. When you derive the first basic results
that way, you have to be very careful on the way you formulate the self
financing condition.
Q: I would imagine that default modeling is important in collateral and
funding, isn’t it? That is the reason why collateral is introduced in the
first place.
A: Indeed, but inclusion of default risk is quite complicated. The fun-
damental funding implications in presence of default risk have been
considered in simple settings first in [72], see also [43]. These works
focus on particularly simple products, such as zero coupon bonds or
loans, in order to highlight some essential features of funding costs.
[56] analyzes implications of currency risk for collateral modeling. [39]
resorts to a PDE approach to funding costs. As I mentioned above [47],
then published in [48] and [49], and [34] remain the most general treat-
ments of funding costs to date. These papers show how complicated it
is to formulate a proper general framework with collateral and funding
but inclusive of default risk.
Q: What are the findings in Morini and Prampolini [72]? I heard of this
paper when it was still a preprint.
A: One important point in Morini and Prampolini [72] is that in simple
payoffs such as bonds DVA can be interpreted as funding, in order to
avoid double counting. However, this result does not extend to general
payoffs, where different aspects interact in a more complex way and
the general approach of Crepey [47] or Pallavicini et al [34] is needed.
Q: All right, ten more papers to read, but what is the funding problem,
basically?
A: To put it in a nutshell, when you need to manage a trading position,
you may need to obtain cash in order to do a number of operations:
hedging the position, posting collateral, and so on. This is cash you
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may obtain from your Treasury department or in the market. You may
also receive cash as a consequence of being in the position: a coupon, a
notional reimbursement, a positive mark to market move, getting some
collateral, a closeout payment. All such flows need to be remunerated:
if you are borrowing, this will have a cost, and if you are lending, this
will provide you with some revenues. Including the cost of funding into
your valuation framework means to properly account for such features.
Q: Well looks like accounting to me
A: [Sighing] The trick is doing this consistently with all other aspects,
especially counterparty risk. A number of practitioners advocate a
“Funding Valuation Adjustment”, or FVA, that would be additive so
that the total price of the portfolio would be
RISK FREE PRICE + DVA - CVA + FVA
However, it is not that simple. Proper inclusion of funding costs leads
to a recursive pricing problem that may be formulated as a backwards
stochastic differential equation (BSDE, as in [47]) or to a discrete time
backward induction equation (as in [34]). The simple additive structure
above is not there in general.
Q: I doubt the banks will be willing to implement BSDEs, and I also doubt
the regulators will prescribe that. We need something simple coming
out of this.
A: All of a sudden you become reasonable and moderate? That’s good
[smiling]. However, sometimes it isn’t possible to simplify dramatically.
22 Hedging Counterparty Risk: CCDS
Q: My last question is this. From what you said above, it looks like Basel
III may impose quite some heavy capital requirements for CVA. Collat-
eralization is a possible way out, but it may become expensive for some
firms and lead to a liquidity strain, while firms that are not organized
for posting collateral may be in troubles. [83] reports the case of the
leading German airline: bear with me, I am low tech compared to you
[Pulls out a pice of paper with part of an article]
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”The airline’s Cologne-based head of finance, Roland Kern,
expects its earnings to become more volatile ”not because
of unpredictable passenger numbers, interest rates or jet fuel
prices, but because it does not post collateral in its deriva-
tives transactions”.
Indeed, without the possibility to post collateral, the firms would be
subject to heavy CVA capital requirements. Is there a third way?
A: There have been proposals for market instruments that can hedge CVA
away, or reduce its capital requirements in principle. One such instru-
ment, for example, is the Contingent Credit Default Swap (CCDS).
Q: What is a CCDS? Anything to do with standard CDS?
A: It is similar to a CDS, but when the reference credit defaults, the
protection seller pays protection on a notional that is not fixed but
is rather given by the loss given default (1 - recovery) fraction of the
residual value of a reference Portfolio at that time, if positive.
Q: So there is both a reference credit, against whose default protection is
traded, and a reference portfolio?
A: Consider this example. Suppose the Bank1 buys a contingent CDS,
offering protection against default of her corporate client, which is the
reference credit. Protection is bought by the bank on the portfolio
the bank is trading with the client. The bank buys this protection
from another bank, say Bank2. The payoff of the default leg of the
Contingent CDS to Bank1 is exactly the unilateral CVA Bank1 would
measure against the corporate client on the traded portfolio. So if
Bank2 is default-free, with the CCDS Bank1 is perfectly hedged against
CVA on the reference portfolio traded with the corporate client, since
the CVA payoff will be matched exactly by the CCDS protection leg.
Q: Have these products been popular in the past?
A: Not really. [Visualizes on the tablet the scan of a newspaper page].
The Financial Times was commenting back in 2008:
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”[...]Rudimentary and idiosyncratic versions of these so-
called CCDS have existed for five years, but they have been
rarely traded due to high costs, low liquidity and limited
scope. [...] Counterparty risk has become a particular con-
cern in the markets for interest rate, currency, and commod-
ity swaps - because these trades are not always backed by
collateral.[...] Many of these institutions - such as hedge
funds and companies that do not issue debt - are beyond
the scope of cheaper and more liquid hedging tools such as
normal CDS. The new CCDS was developed to target these
institutions (Financial Times, April 10, 2008).”
Interest on CCDS has come back in 2011 now that CVA capital charges
risk to become punitive. However, CCDS do not fully solve the problem
of CVA capital requirements. First of all, there is no default free Bank2,
so the CCDS itself would be subject to Counterparty risk. Also, it is
not clear how CCDS would work in the bilateral case. And the hedging
problem of a possible Bilateral CCDS (with all the DVA problems seen
above) would fall on Bank2, so that the problem is only moved. While
CCDS can be helpful in limited contexts, it is probably worth looking
for alternatives.
Q: So the market forgot about CCDS?
A: Not really. In fact, CCDS are now finally standardized on index port-
folios by ISDA. ISDA came out with templates and documentation
for CCDS, you may find those on the ISDA web site. Still, most of
the problems I mentioned above are still there. This is prompting the
industry to look for other solutions that may be effective also across
several counterparties at the same time.
Q: For example?
A: CVA securitization could be considered, although the word “securiti-
zation” is not much popular these days.
Q: Is there any proposed form of CVA restructuring, or securitization?
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23 Restructuring Credit Risk: CVA-CDOs
and Margin Lending
A: [Concentrating, looking tired] There are a few. I am familiar with a
few deals that have been discussed in the press, and in the Financial
Times blog Alphaville in particular [77].
Q: The FT? Looks like this made the mainstream media
A: Yes. Let me show you [connects with the FT aplahville web site].
”In short, Barclays has taken a pool of loans and securitised them,
but retained all but the riskiest piece. On that riskiest Euro 300m,
Barclays has bought protection from an outside investor, e.g. hedge
fund. That investor will get paid coupons over time for their trouble,
but will also be hit with any losses on the loans, up to the total amount
of their investment. To ensure that the investor can actually absorb
these losses, collateral is posted with Barclays.”
Q: Looks like a CDO from the little I know? Looks like an equity tranche
backed by collateral.
A: Yes, collateral is key here. The blog continues:
”This point about collateral means that, at least in theory, Barclays is
not exposed to the counterparty risk of the hedge fund. This is espe-
cially important because the hedge fund is outside the normal sphere
of regulation, i.e. they aren’t required to hold capital against risk-
weighted assets in the way banks are.”
Notice this point of transferring risk outside the regulated system. This
is a point that is stressed also in the OECD paper [12]. The blog
continues:
”[...] And then there is the over-engineering element whereby some
deals were, and maybe still are, done where the premiums paid over
time to the hedge fund are actually equal to or above the expected loss
of the transaction. That the Fed and Basel Committee were concerned
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enough to issue guidance on this is noteworthy. It’ll be down to in-
dividual national regulators to prevent ”over-engineering”, and some
regulators are more hands-on than others.”
So there you have it.
Q: Interesting, are you aware of any other such deals?
A: I know of a different one called SCORE. Again FT alphaville, this time
from [78]:
”RBS had a good go at securitising these exposures, but the deal didn’t
quite make it over the line. However, Euroweek reports that banks are
still looking into it:
’Royal Bank of Scotlands securitisation of counterparty credit risk, dubbed
Score 2011, was pulled earlier this year, but other banks are said to be
undeterred by the difficulties of the asset class, and are still looking at
the market. However, other hedging options for counterparty risk may
have dulled the economics of securitising this risk since the end of last
year.’
So this is has not been that successful.
A: Not really. The latest I heard of is Credit Suisse: [79]:
”Last week Credit Suisse announced it had bought protection on the
senior slice of its unusual employee compensation plan. The Swiss bank
pays some of its senior bankers using a bond referencing counterparty
risk, which also involves shifting some counterparty credit risk from the
bank to its workers.”
So that is like buying protection from your own employees. Interesting
concept if you think about it. That way the employee, in theory, is
incentivized in improving the risk profile of the company.
Q: Maybe I’m a rookie, but to be honest I wouldn’t be too happy if I
were paid that kind of bonus. It may work for super-senior employees,
like you, but for me... well... I don’t participate into the important
decisions of the company, I’m not a decision maker.
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Figure 1: General counterparty scheme including quadri-partite structure.
A: You overestimate my importance, I’m not the CEO, CFO, CRO, CIO,
or C∗O, I’m just your average risk manager!!
Q: But is this all about Counterparty Risk restructuring? No other idea?
No new idea?
A: There are actually more innovative ideas. On CVA securitization, see
for example [2], that advocates a global valuation model. The more
model–agnostic [3] explains how margin lending through quadri-partite
or penta-partite structures involving clearing houses would be effective
in establishing a third way.
Q: [Excitedly] Can you tell me more? This sounds intriguing.
A: Let me borrow from [2] and [3], to which I refer for the full details. If
I understood correctly, the structure is like this [draws Figure 1 on her
tablet]
Q: How does this picture work?
A: Traditionally, the CVA is typically charged by the structuring bank B
either on an upfront basis or it is built into the structure as a fixed
coupon stream. The above deals we discussed, such as Papillon and
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Score, are probably of this type too. Margin lending instead is pred-
icated on the notion of floating rate CVA payments with periodic re-
sets...
Q: What is “floating rate CVA”?
A: Whichever formulation of CVA and DVA is chosen, once could postulate
that CVA and DVA are paid periodically on rolling protection intervals.
The related CVA is term ”Floating Rate CVA” (FRCVA), and similarly
for DVA. Assume for simplicity that we are in a bi-partite transaction
between the default-free bank B and the defaultable counterparty (say
a corporate client) C. In principle, instead of charging CVA upfront at
time 0 for the whole maturity of the portfolio, the bank may require a
CVA payment at time 0 for protection on the exposure up to 6 months.
Then in 6 months the bank will require a CVA payment for protection
for further six months on what will be the exposure up to one year, and
on and on, up to the final maturity of the deal. Such a CVA would be
an example of FRCVA.
Q: Ok, back to Figure 1
A: I was saying that margin lending is based on the notion of floating rate
CVA payments with periodic resets, and is designed in such a way to
transfer the conditional credit spread volatility risk and the mark-to-
market volatility risk from the bank to the counterparties. We may
explain this more in detail by following the arrows in the Figure.
Q: Ok, I’m ready, looking at Figure 1 [Excited]
A: Relax a second. The counterparty C, a corporate client, has problems
with posting collateral periodically in order to trade derivatives with
bank B. To avoid posting collateral, C enters into a margin lending
transaction. C pays periodically (say semi-annually) a floating rate
CVA to the margin lender A (‘premium’ arrow connecting C to A),
which the margin lender A pays to investors (premium arrow connecting
A to Investors). This latest payment can have a seniority structure
similar to that of a cash CDO.
Q: Dangerous territory there... [Grinning]
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A: [Flashing an irritated look] Let me finish. In exchange for this premium,
for six months the investors provide the margin lender A with daily
collateral posting (‘collateral’ arrow connecting Investors to A) and A
passes the collateral to a custodian (‘collateral’ arrow connecting A to
the custodian). This way, if C defaults within the semi-annual period,
the collateral is paid to B to provide protection (‘protection’ arrow
connecting the custodian to B) and the loss in taken by the Investors
who provided the collateral.
Q: Ok, so far it’s clear.
A: At the end of the six months period, the margin lender may decide
whether to continue with the deal or to back off. With this mechanism
C is bearing the CVA volatility risk, whereas B is not exposed to CVA
volatility risk, which is the opposite of what happens with traditional
upfront CVA charges.
Q: So one of the big differences with traditional CVA is that in this struc-
ture the CVA volatility stays with the counterparty C that is generating
it, and does not go to the bank B.
A: Indeed, [3] argue that whenever an entity’s credit worsens, it receives
a subsidy from its counterparties in the form of a DVA positive mark
to market which can be monetized by the entity’s bond holders only
upon their own default. Whenever an entity’s credit improves instead,
it is effectively taxed as its DVA depreciates. Wealth is thus transferred
from the equity holders of successful companies to the bond holders of
failing ones, the transfer being mediated by banks acting as financial
intermediaries and implementing the traditional CVA/DVA mechanics.
Q: Whoa!
A: [Smiling] It’s good to see someone still so refreshingly enthusiastic. Re-
warding failing firms with a cash subsidy may be a practice of debatable
merit as it skews competition. But rewarding failing firms with a DVA
benefit is without question suboptimal from an economic standpoint:
the DVA benefit they receive is paid in cash from their counterparties
but, once received in this form, it cannot be invested and can only be
monetized by bond holders upon default.
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Q: I see...
A: Again, [3] submits that margin lending structures may help reversing
the macroeconomic effect by eliminating long term counterparty credit
risk insurance and avoiding the wealth transfer that benefits the bond
holders of defaulted entities.
Q: I can see a number of problems with this. First, proper valuation and
hedging of this to the investor who are providing collateral to the lender
is going to be tough. I recall there is no satisfactory standard for even
simple synthetic CDOs. One would need an improved methodology.
A: Weren’t you the one complaining about the situation being already
too complicated? But indeed, the modeling problems have been high-
lighted for example in [35]. Admittedly this requires and effective global
valuation framework, see for example the discussion in [2].
Q: The other problem is: what if all margin lenders pull off at some point
due to a systemic crisis?
A: That would be a problem, indeed, but [3] submits that the market is
less likely to arrive in such a situation in the first place if the wrong
incentives to defaulting firms are stopped and an opposite structure,
such as the one in Figure 1 is implemented. There is also a penta-partite
version including a clearing house.
Q: Mmmm.... I understand that if the counterparty credit risk deterio-
rates, the counterparty will be charged more. Isn’t this something that
could compromise the relationship of a bank with an important client?
A: It is. One could diminish this by putting a cap and a floor on the
floating CVA, and then however pricing and hedging this cap risk would
go back to part of the original problems. Part of the volatility would
be still neutralized, however.
Q: But I can see the appeal of floating CVA. It’s like car insurance. If you
drive well next year you expect to be rewarded with less premium next
year. If you drive poorly and have an accident you may expect your
premium to go up. Everyone accepts this. So I think it could work also
with banks.
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A: Well the client relationship is more complex with banks, but yes that is
an initial analogy. In any case there is much more work to do to assess
this framework properly, and it is evolving continually.
Q: This looks like a good place to stop then.
A: Indeed. [Smiling but looking tired]
Q: Thanks for your time and patience. [Smiling gratefully but still a little
puzzled]
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